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Abstract
Financiers of social entrepreneurs are typically characterized as having some form of pro-
social or CSR related objective. While in some studies such objectives have been formulated 
on an analytically inconvenient level, other contributions are limited only to charity finance. 
In this paper we identify Fehr and Schmidt’s inequality aversion as an analytically tractable 
and most basic motivation of social financiers in general. Specifically, we show that the 
financiers’ decision structures and their observable behavior coincide with the experimental 
findings of Fehr and Schmidt (1999). Moreover, we derive behavioral implications for social 
entrepreneurs. Paradoxically, given that financiers do not prefer a self-consumption of the 
social service, they contribute more if the entrepreneur provides them nevertheless. 
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11. Introduction 
Social entrepreneurs solve societal problems by creating goods or services that meet the 
needs of specific disadvantaged individuals. Their operations are financed through diverse 
sources. Some entrepreneurs generate earned income by charging user fees or member dues 
while other organizations sell mission-unrelated goods or services on for-profit markets. 
Despite such activities, social entrepreneurs often rely heavily on external funds. As an 
indication, the US SIF Foundation (2012) reports that individuals, institutions, investment 
companies, or money managers held $3.74 trillion of socially responsible investment assets in 
2012 in the United States. For the same year, Giving USA (2013) highlights that US 
charitable contributions totaled $316.23 billion.
As external finance is apparently important for a social venture’s success, it is essential to 
understand how social entrepreneurs can optimally attract such funds. In this paper we seek 
to identify, in a first instance, a simple common motivation by which social financiers are 
guided. This motivation allows us, in a next step, to derive several important implications for 
the optimal design of entrepreneurial ventures.  
The management literature has long assumed that investors pursue only financial returns. 
This perspective has been challenged quite recently as it lacks to explain why social ventures 
are usually able to attract funds even though they cannot offer investors a market-adequate 
repayment. In this line, some approaches suggest that, in addition to financial returns, socially 
responsible investors usually seek to fulfill some social as well as personal objectives.1
Hence, they are willing to sacrifice a part of their profits in expectation of some non-
monetary value. Other observations reveal that profit-oriented firms often implement 
corporate-social-responsibility strategies in hope of satisfying stakeholder needs. In this 
respect, they build partnerships with social entrepreneurs and support them financially.2
Obviously, the outlined motivations are able to explain why social entrepreneurs receive 
external funds despite their limited repayment ability. However, these general preferences are 
less applicable to predict the funding behavior of investors in response to the social 
entrepreneur’s operational decisions such as the choice of the target group or the quality of 
the social good or service. 
1 Compare, for example, Bollen (2007), Buttle (2007), Derwall et al. (2011), Pérez-Gladish et al. (2012), and 
Schueth (2003). 
2 Compare, for example, Nelson and Jenkins (2006), Prieto-Cárron et al. (2006), Zahra et al. (2008). 
2In contrast, analytically convenient preferences can be found in the public-economics 
literature. Among others, such preferences include altruism3, warm glow4, prestige5, or 
inequality aversion6. The corresponding studies as well as related works focus exclusively on 
donations to charitable causes and provide several insights of how charities can increase their 
fundraising success. For example, Harbaugh (1998) finds that nonprofit organizations can 
increase contributions by publicizing donations in dollar categories rather than by reporting 
the exact amount. Or, Andreoni (2006) shows that the announcement of initial gifts has a 
positive influence on the subsequent fundraising success. 
This paper attempts to identify an analytically tractable and most basic motivation of a 
wide class of social-financier types, not only contributors to charities. As a plausible 
restriction, however, we just consider private individuals or institutions, as the motivation of 
public decision makers may be dominated by political goals (Kickul and Lyons, 2012). We 
start our analysis by revealing typical decision structures of social financiers and find that the 
structures are almost identical to two experimental settings analyzed in the literature on 
public economics, viz., the dictator and the public-good game. Most prominently, Fehr and 
Schmidt (1999)7 (henceforth F&S) found that in such experiments individuals are governed 
by inequality aversion. By contrasting empirically observable behavior of financiers and 
participants of such experiments, we follow F&S and argue that this preference specification 
is also a promising candidate to explain the behavior of social financiers in general.
With the F&S specification of inequality aversion at hand, we derive several implications 
concerning the optimal design of the entrepreneurial venture. For example, we find that the 
entrepreneur should provide the service only to individuals who are poorer than his social 
financiers. Likewise, the service quality should be limited. Moreover, we show that financiers 
dislike costless own direct benefits, e.g., through consuming the entrepreneur’s service, if 
they perceive a strong disutility from being better off than other individuals. Paradoxically, 
though, the entrepreneur should nevertheless enable such direct benefits as they will increase 
the financiers’ total contributions.
3 See Bergstrom et al. (1986). 
4 See Andreoni (1989). 
5 See Harbaugh (1998). 
6 See Fehr and Schmidt (1999) or Bolton and Ockenfels (2000). 
7 Until Dec, 2013 the paper received over 6000 Google-Scholar citations, which is unique among all 
publications in the field of social preferences. 
3The paper is organized as follows. In the next section we analyze typical decision 
structures and behavior of social-venture financiers and contrast our findings with existing 
experimental results. In the third section we briefly introduce a technical characterization of 
F&S-inequality aversion and adjust it to the social entrepreneurship context. In the fourth 
section some basic propositions concerning the behavior of social financiers are derived. We 
then indicate further important behavioral issues whose analysis would also benefit from an 
application of the F&S-preference function. Finally, we conclude this paper with implications 
for further research. 
2. Decision structures and financier behavior in social-venture funding 
The identification of a financier’s decision structure in social-venture financing requires, first 
of all, a closer look on the fields of activities of social entrepreneurs. In principle, 
entrepreneurs create social value by solving social problems through innovative processes 
and ideas. There is rich evidence that poverty8 or the non-provision of public goods through 
commercial markets or the government9 are central to a large part of social problems. Poverty 
or, more specifically, the inability of people to pay for goods and services traded on markets 
often entails that basic human needs cannot be satisfied. In this respect, social entrepreneurs 
provide subsidized or free-of-charge private goods or services (henceforth social services) to 
needy individuals. Typically, social services are designed to meet urgent consumption needs 
directly (e.g., food, shelter, clothing, health care) or to empower individuals to self-improve 
their life-situation (e.g., micro-loans, education and training, advocacy, access to networks).  
For example, Aidchild mainly aims at satisfying basic human needs of HIV-infected 
orphans in Uganda who do not receive support from extended family members. Founded in 
2000, the organization runs multiple centers and serves more than 3,000 children and adults 
with numerous services such as shelter, food, medical care, and education.10 In contrast, the 
nonprofit organization KIVA alleviates poverty by empowering needy individuals to self-
improve their living standard. KIVA runs an internet platform which seeks to match micro-
loan investors in the industrialized world with loan applicants in developing countries. Given 
a successful matching, the investors’ funds are forwarded by the organization to a local 
microfinance institution which grants the loan to the beneficiary and monitors its repayment. 
8 Compare Dees (1998), Seelos and Mair (2005), Austin et al. (2006), and Starke (2012). 
9 Compare Bilodeau and Slivinski (1998), Austin et al. (2006), and Nicholls (2009). 
10 Compare Aidchild (2013). 
4Basically, KIVA pays no interests to the investor, however, in order to cover operating costs 
the local finance partner charges a fee which lies below market prices.11
Beside poverty alleviation through social services, entrepreneurs also engage in the 
provision of public goods where governments fail to do so. Here, entrepreneurs often provide 
environmental, cultural, political or infrastructural projects. In general, a public good is 
characterized by the non-exclusion and non-rivalry properties. Specifically, once the good is 
provided, no individual can be excluded from its consumption and the own consumption is 
not affected by other individuals’ behavior. For example, an improved infrastructure benefits 
all individuals in the corresponding geographic region. All people can use the good and the 
individual benefit is, in principle, not affected by the others’ use of the infrastructure.
The encyclopedia Wikipedia is one of the most prominent examples for public goods. 
Founded in 2003 the non-profit US-American foundation Wikimedia Inc. provides and 
administers a general internet knowledge infrastructure in 285 languages which is free to 
everybody and of course non-rival in consumption. The encyclopedia is supported by 
volunteers who write and edit pages as well as donors who cover the majority of 
administration and development costs.12
In order to cover the costs of supplying social services or public goods, entrepreneurs, 
typically, apply for funds with a variety of financiers such as private donors, sponsors, or 
social investors. During the application process, the financiers expect the entrepreneur to 
provide detailed information about the project, which enables them to assess the impact of 
their funding. Specifically, financiers demand information concerning the social problem, the 
involved and targeted individuals, and the costs and benefits of providing the good or service. 
In general, social entrepreneurs document such details in their business plans, in 
advertisements, or on their internet platforms. For example, Aidchild publishes nutrition lists 
which detail the weekly menu supplied in its care centers and KIVA specifies the purpose of 
a granted loan. Wikipedia informs in length where and with what desired effect money is 
spent or new projects are launched.  
With the detailed project information at hand, financiers consider the amount and 
conditions of funding (e.g., interest rate, repayment, duration). In this respect, it can often be 
observed that, in contrast to supporting profit-oriented projects, social financiers voluntarily 
11 Compare Kiva (2013). 
12 Compare Wikipedia (2013). 
5agree on funding conditions that imply a below-market return on investment. This sacrifice of 
return is important for social entrepreneurs as the peculiarities of the social problem often 
preclude them from designing the good or service in a profitable manner. For example, 
Aidchild cannot charge orphans the local market prices for food or housing as their payment 
ability is insufficient. A similar problem occurs with public goods. Due to the non-exclusion 
property, prices cannot be charged for such goods and, therefore, their provision must be 
financed by voluntary contributions. The limited opportunity to generate financial returns 
prevents social entrepreneurs from applying for funds at usual capital markets. Instead, as 
Emerson (2003) points out, social financiers are willing to support entrepreneurs with non-
repayable funds or repayable capital with below market returns on investment. These funding 
instruments have in common that financiers give up own monetary payoff in comparison to 
investments in commercial markets. In the following, we refer to this foregone payoff as a 
donation.
As indicated above, in most cases, the entrepreneur not only forwards donations to 
people in need, as can be observed with KIVA, but transforms it into a social service or 
public good. This is an important feature of the financier’s decision structure as the 
transformation, in turn, is likely to influence his willingness to donate. Specifically, the 
recipient’s benefit level from consumption (valued in monetary terms) can be higher or lower 
as the monetary donation. For example, the consumption benefit of a service tends to be 
lower if the entrepreneur has to cover administration costs, or the recipient‘s preference for 
the supplied service is not as intense as for other services offered at markets. In contrast, it 
tends to be higher if the financier’s contribution is intended for self help, e.g., high-quality 
education helps the beneficiary realize a much higher future income. The benefit of the 
entrepreneur’s service is also higher if the service implies a need satisfaction for the recipient 
that cannot be reached by forwarding the donations directly. This is the case, for example, if, 
with the transferred money at hand, the recipient is not able to buy a similar good or service 
at a market price that includes a significant profit margin.  
Up to this point, we identified three important features of a financier’s decision structure 
which are common for social services and public goods. First, the financier basically decides 
on the level of donations which he transfers to the social entrepreneur. Second, the 
entrepreneur works as an intermediary who transforms the donation into a social service or 
public good and provides it to the target group. Third, the financier knows (at least partially) 
6the entrepreneur’s target group, and he is also capable to develop an idea of how recipients 
benefit from the good or service.
However, a relevant distinction between both decision structures is given by the 
consumption properties rivalry and exclusion. Accordingly, a financier who contributes a 
Dollar to a public good creates an unrestricted benefit to all consumers who wish to consume 
the good. A further, yet unconsidered, typical difference in comparison to social services is 
that the financier can also consume the public good. For example, any individual who donates 
to Wikipedia is also free to use its internet service. As a consequence, the benefit from self-
consumption increases the user’s contribution willingness. In the extreme case, the personal 
consumption benefit exceeds the contribution level and, hence, it pays for the financier to 
fund the public good completely on his own. However, in many cases the consumption 
benefit is relatively low such that a one-Dollar contribution increases utility by a value below 
one Dollar. 
From a theoretical perspective, the analyzed features of the two decision structures 
suggest an unambiguous prediction of a financier’s behavior. Independent of whether a social 
service or a public good is considered, a selfish and rational decision maker will not wish to 
donate as the contribution implies a net reduction of the own payoff. Moreover, a decision 
maker concerned with financing a public good even increases his payoff by free-riding on the 
others’ contributions. Although it can be observed that many individuals do not donate to 
social organizations, there exists a large body of evidence that does not comply with the 
theoretical prediction. For example, as GfK (2011) reports, about 35 percent of European 
households donate annually to charitable causes. In addition, KIVA reports that $111,078,600 
have been granted in 201213 and Aidchild states that 30 percent of the annual budget is 
covered by donations14. Finally, for Wikipedia almost all revenues stem from voluntary 
contributions.15
Over the last decades, such contradictions have led economists to search for other 
motives than egoism which are able to explain the empirical findings. A seminal approach in 
this vain has been put forward by F&S who looked for a simple common principle that was 
able to explain the social behavior of individuals in various experiments. They concluded that 
individuals are basically guided by inequality aversion, which “means that people resist 
13 See Kiva (2013). 
14 See Aidchild (2013). 
15 See Wikipedia (2013). 
7inequitable outcomes; i.e., they are willing to give up some material payoff to move in the 
direction of more equitable outcomes” (F&S, p. 819). In this paper we argue that inequality 
aversion is a promising candidate for explaining the behavior of private social-venture 
financiers. In the remainder of this section, we give two reasons which support our 
hypothesis. First, the decision structures analyzed in this section are basically equivalent to 
two investigated experimental settings in the F&S study, viz., the dictator and the public-
good game without punishment. Second, the behavior of social-venture financiers is almost 
identical to the behavior of participants in the F&S experiments. 
We begin our argumentation by contrasting the experimental settings with the financier’s 
decision structures in Figure 1. We use ovals to symbolize individuals and hexagons for the 
sets of public information. In addition, the rectangle in the public-good game represents an 
automatic process. The characterizations of the financier’s decision structures on the left-
hand side account for the previously highlighted features. Specifically, prior to the financier’s 
decision on the donation level, he receives information about the entrepreneur’s planned 
allocation or public-good characteristics, i.e., at what costs are donations transformed into a 
good or service, which individuals are targeted and how do they benefit. The figure also 
shows that, in contrast to social services, public goods are non-excludable and non-rival. 
Therefore, each individual benefits from the financier’s contribution. 
The corresponding experimental settings are characterized on the right-hand side of 
Figure 1. Accordingly, in the dictator game the decision maker knows the specific allocation 
rule, previously announced by the experimenter,16 and decides how much of his own money 
should be spent to benefit another (other) individual(s). He is free to offer any share of his 
money and the other individuals must accept this decision, specifically, they cannot influence 
the dictator’s payoff. In other words, if the dictator offers nothing, he keeps the complete 
amount of money, and the other individuals receive nothing. If he offers a positive share, he 
keeps the residuum and the other individuals benefit from his contribution. The lower panel 
of Figure 1 considers the public-good game where each individual decides on a contribution 
to the provision of the good. Initially, a payment reduces the payoff of the contributor. But, 
once the good is provided, a specific surplus is added to the payoff of all individuals. As an 
important feature, the contribution creates an individual pay-off surplus below the contribu- 
16 In standard dictator experiments, the rule simply states that each given Dollar reaches the recipient without 
any (efficiency) loss. 
8Figure 1: Contrasting the financiers’ decision structures with experimental settings 
tion value but, on the other hand, also implies an aggregated surplus over all consumers, 
which exceeds the contribution level. 
In principle, the experimental games and the financier’s decision structures differ only in 
one element: The transformation of money into a consumption good or service. As argued 
above, the entrepreneurial transformation may change the decision outcomes quantitatively 
or, from the financier’s view, may cause, a deviation of the recipients’ benefit from the 
donation value. This deviation incites the financier to donate a lower or higher amount 
compared to the direct distribution of money. However, from a qualitative perspective, there 
is no difference between the decision situations of financiers and experimental dictators since 
the crucial property is included in both settings: The financier decides on the reduction of his 
own monetary payoff and, simultaneously, as the flip side of this decision, on how much the 
recipient’s utility will be increased. We, therefore, propose that the two experimental settings 
are conceptually equivalent to both financier’s decision contexts and well-suited to analyze 
the motives which incite social financiers to give up own wealth. 
The theoretical predictions of the individuals’ behavior in the dictator and public-good 
experiments are identical compared to the social-financier case. Specifically, selfish dictators 
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9will not wish to donate own monetary payoff to other individuals. Likewise, egoistic 
participants maximize their own utility by not contributing to the public good and, hence, by 
playing a free-rider strategy. However, F&S present experimental data which show that these 
predictions are only partly correct. For example, they cite two studies which found that in 
two-player-dictator games 60 to 80 percent of the dictators donated up to 50 percent of their 
own payoff to individuals with lower payoffs. Similar results were presented for 12 studies of 
repeated public-good games. F&S examined only the final period of these experiments and 
found that on average 73 percent of the participants did not contribute in this period. 
Consequently, the selected studies show that the behavior of individuals in both experimental 
settings is quite mixed, a result that is also indicated above for social-venture financing in 
practice.  
We complete this section by emphasizing that the characterized experimental settings are 
not appropriate to analyze the behavior of for-profit social entrepreneurs. In this case, the 
social entrepreneur acts not simply as a channel for the financier’s donations but, instead, 
decides on how much of the donated share will be applied to the transformation process and 
how much will be self-consumed. This decision structure departs significantly from the 
dictator or public-good game. Only if the entrepreneur announces the own profit share in 
advance and, hence, decides prior to the financier, the decision structures are retained from 
the financier’s perspective. 
3. F&S inequality aversion and its application to social financing 
F&S model the preferences of distributors in experiments as self-centered inequality 
aversion, meaning that a decision maker experiences a disutility if his own payoff exceeds or 
falls short of the payoff of   other individuals to whom he compares himself. F&S use 
the following specification to characterize inequality aversion: 
(1) 	
  	 


  		  	  


  		  	  .
According to the first term of Equation (1), the decision maker  perceives a direct utility 
from the own payoff 	. This utility is reduced by the other two terms which represent the 
disutility from monetary inequality. Specifically, the middle term shows that the decision 
maker dislikes being worse off than others. The payoff difference toward each wealthier 
individual is weighted by    
 . In contrast, the third term represents the disutility from 
having a higher payoff than others and the term’s impact is determined by    
 . Due 
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to this specification, the F&S preference function accounts for different degrees of inequality 
aversion. A purely egoistic individual is characterized by      and maximizes utility 
by keeping the whole payoff for own consumption. An identical behavior results for subjects 
with    and   . Such individuals envy wealthier people but they do not care for the 
poor. Only for a sufficiently large , the disutility from advantageous inequality (i.e., the 
payoff difference toward poorer individuals) is predominant for the decision maker, and he is 
willing to share his payoff with others in order to reduce this inequality.  
As previously argued, inequality aversion seems to be well suited to explain the behavior 
of social financiers. The F&S specification, as given by Equation (1), assumes that, in a first 
step, the financier compares himself to a group of specific individuals. A non-exhaustive list 
of such individuals may include relatives, friends, neighbors, colleagues, celebrities, and 
target groups of social entrepreneurs. In the following we will subsume such individuals 
under the term circle of concern. The financier compares himself to individuals in the circle 
of concern on the basis of specific ‘payoffs’. According to the social entrepreneurship context 
characterized in the second section, two categories of measures appear to be relevant: First, 
financiers may compare consumption levels. Suchlike evaluations could include a specific 
category (e.g., only food consumption) or a consumption average over all goods and services 
of concern. Second, financiers may consider income levels whose comparison can be carried 
out on a micro or a macro scale. For example, other individuals may be valued by the 
available budget to purchase a specific good or service or they may be compared in terms of 
total monetary wealth.  
The necessary information to determine such measures is available from different 
sources. Specifically, the income and consumption levels of other individuals can be 
approximated by direct observations (e.g., job, consumption behavior, residence etc.), 
interviews, income publications (e.g., Forbes 500 list, published wage categories for public 
servants), news information, or income and poverty reports on country or regional basis. 
Moreover, entrepreneurs often report further wealth-relevant information concerning their 
target group, especially in the case of poverty alleviation. For example, KIVA publishes 
income relevant data about loan applicants to a potential financier, e.g., type of their business, 
number of children, and regional economic statistics. Beside the financier’s assessment of 
individual incomes or consumption endowments, the decision on his donation also requires 
him to determine how his contribution will affect the recipients’ endowments after the 
entrepreneurial transformation process. If consumption levels are compared, financiers can 
11
use information provided by entrepreneurs or other sources about who is served and with 
what intensity. For example, Aidchild publishes nutrition lists which detail the weekly menu 
supplied in its care centers and KIVA specifies the purpose a loan is used for. If financiers 
compare income levels, they may estimate the monetary value of the entrepreneur’s good or 
service by involving its market value or average costs. Moreover, recognizing also 
intertemporal effects, financiers could estimate how the future income or consumption level 
of recipients is impacted. For instance, in the case of KIVA financiers may approximate how 
a microloan will increase the living standard of the loan recipient. Independent of which 
measures financiers use in practice to compare their personal wealth to that of others, in the 
following, we will only refer to the term wealth to keep terminology as simple as possible. 
Consequently, in Equation (1) 	 denotes the wealth level of the financier and 	 the wealth 
of an individual in his circle of concern. 
Figure 2 illustrates two exemplary decision frameworks. In Panel A the financier 
considers contributing to a social-service provision (viz. KIVA) whereas Panel B 
characterizes a public-good-decision situation (viz. Wikipedia). In both panels each black 
point represents a specific individual in the financier’s circle of concern and indicates the 
respective wealth level before the financier’s contribution is made. The financier’s 
endowment is marked by the dashed line. In contrast, the white points indicate the resulting 
wealth levels after the financier’s contribution has been transformed and allocated to the 
beneficiary. Additionally, the black arrows symbolize the exact amount of the donation and 
the dotted arrows characterize the financier’s perceived improvement of the recipients’ 
wealth due to the entrepreneur’s provision.
As can be observed with Panel A the micro loan initiated by KIVA reduces the wealth of 
the private financier by a relatively small amount as he foregoes only the payment of interest. 
However, the benefit of the recipient is probably much larger. The individual usually uses the 
loan for productive purposes such as launching an own business or buying agricultural 
equipment, which may increase the future wealth level significantly. In Panel B the financier 
contributes to Wikipedia which uses the money, for example, to improve its service. 
Typically, the improvement will be relatively small and, hence, many Wikipedia users in the 
financier’s circle of concern will perceive only a marginal increase of their consumption 
benefits. The panel also accounts for the fact that consumption is voluntary: The financier 
uses the web service whereas some others refuse it. Consequently, they do not benefit from 
the financier’s contribution. 
12
    Panel A – social service                                                        Panel B – public good
Figure 2: The financier’s decision framework in the case of KIVA (Panel A) and Wikipedia 
(Panel B). 
Given the characterized decision framework, the financier chooses the level of donations 
that maximizes his utility . In order to simplify the analytical determination of this 
optimum, we rewrite Equation (1) without loss of generality as follows:
(2) 
  	    

 


 	 	 ! "  	    

  
#

 		    

   	 ! "  .
Equation (2) includes two further specifications. First, we extend Equation (1) by the decision 
variable  which denotes the financier’s donation level. In Figure 2  corresponds exactly 
to the length of the black arrow. Second, to account explicitly for the recipients’ consumption 
benefits, we introduce the parameter  $  which characterizes individual %’s constant 
marginal consumption benefit if the financier increases his donation. In Figure 2, 
consequently,  equals the length of the dotted arrow for individual % which may differ 
from the length of the black arrow. For example, a KIVA loan implies    because the 
recipient’s productive use of the financier’s contribution leads to a relatively high future 
wealth improvement. Hence, the recipient’s benefit is larger than the financier’s foregone 
interest. In the Wikipedia case, however, recipients benefit only marginally from a given 
contribution, i.e., we have  & .
Equation (2) implies the following marginal utility of donating:
Wealth
xi, xj
Financier
Individuals i,j
Loan recipient
Wealth
xi, xj
Financier
Individuals i,j
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(3)
'()

')
   
 


  
* !
#

  
*+ !

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In Equation (3), . denotes the group of individuals who are at least as wealthy as the 
financier, and .+ characterizes the group of poorer individuals. Furthermore, * and *+
denote the numbers of individuals belonging to the respective groups. As highlighted with 
Equation (3), the marginal utility of donating is composed of four effects: 
A negative consumption effect: The financier’s contribution reduces his own 
consumption level (in Figure 2: reduction from the black to the white point) and, thus, his 
utility. This effect is the smaller, the higher  is, i.e., the own consumption benefit of the 
entrepreneur’s good or service. 
A negative disadvantage effect: Due to the reduction of the financier’s wealth, the 
disadvantageous inequality toward all wealthier individuals increases. In Figure 2 such 
individuals are above the dashed wealth line, and the financier’s donation increases the 
distance towards these individuals, which he dislikes. 
A positive advantage effect: In contrast, the financier’s utility increases as a lower own 
wealth reduces the advantageous inequality toward all poorer individuals below the dashed 
line. 
A recipient effect: The algebraic sign of this effect is indeterminate. The entrepreneur 
forwards the financier’s donation to one or more beneficiaries, which increases their wealth. 
Given that a recipient is wealthier than the financier, the disadvantageous inequality increases 
and, hence, the financier’s utility is reduced. If the recipient is poorer, the advantageous 
inequality decreases, which implies a utility increase. This second case is characterized in 
Figure 2, panel A. The relative wealthy investor grants a zero-interest rate loan to the poor 
applicant in the developing country. The beneficiary uses the loan for a business investment 
that generates a higher future wealth (white point). However, as indicated previously, the 
entrepreneur may choose more than one beneficiary. In this case, the recipient effect is a 
weighted accumulation of the respective inequality variations. The extreme case is given for 
public goods where the effect includes all individuals in the financier’s circle of concern who 
wish to consume the good. This case is depicted in Figure 2, panel B. 
          consumption       disadvantage                 advantage                                    recipient 
               effect                   effect                           effect                                         effect 
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4. Implications for social-venture financing 
Having identified inequality aversion as a candidate for the motivation of private social-
venture financiers, we can now characterize their funding behavior and predict their reactions 
to situational changes. Below, we highlight some basic behavioral patterns in form of 
propositions, each proved by pointing to the responsible marginal-utility effects in Equation 
(3). Subsequently, we discuss selected implications of the propositions for social 
entrepreneurs who are interested in attracting a maximum level of funds. 
As a first issue, consider the entrepreneurial distribution policy. Basically, the social 
entrepreneur can choose between two allocation strategies. Either he supports an individual 
who is at least as wealthy as the financier or he serves an individual who is strictly poorer. 
The first strategy increases inequality because the recipient’s consumption benefit enlarges 
the wealth difference toward the financier whereas the second strategy reduces inequality. 
Consequently, as the financier perceives an aversion toward inequality, he will prefer 
entrepreneurs serving poorer individuals. We capture this basic result in Proposition 1. 
Proposition 1. The financier’s willingness to donate is higher for poorer than for wealthier 
recipients.  
The validity of Proposition 1 can be shown by simply analyzing the recipient effect in 
Equation (3). Accordingly, a marginal increase of a beneficiary’s wealth increases utility if 
the recipient is worse off than the financier. However, utility decreases if beneficiaries are 
better or equally well off. Thus, the marginal utility of donating is larger for poorer than for 
wealthier recipients. 
Proposition 1 contributes to several results from experimental social psychology which 
found a positive relationship between an individual’s need for help and the likelihood that 
others will offer this help. This positive correlation is confirmed for various settings, e.g., 
Levitt and Kornhaber (1977) compared donations of randomly approached pedestrians, 
whereas Cheung and Chan (2000) conducted a general telephone survey in Hong-Kong 
analyzing the giving intent. The positive relationship between the need for help and the 
incentive to offer help also holds for different conceptions of an individual’s neediness. In 
this respect, Levitt and Kornhaber (1977) compared donations to solicitors who exhibited 
different handicaps, and Berkowitz (1968) conducted controlled field experiments among 
male students where neediness was characterized by the affiliation to different social classes. 
Nevertheless, most studies do not specify a concrete social motive to explain the observed 
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behavior, with a few exceptions, e.g., Berkowitz (1968) who analyzed the explanatory value 
of reciprocity in such settings. In this line, Proposition 1 complements the literature as it 
shows that inequality aversion may well explain the observed behavior of contributors.
Proposition 1 enables us to identify two behavioral implications for entrepreneurs 
supplying social services. First, the entrepreneur maximizes fundraising success by serving 
the poorest individuals. Specifically, a switch from a wealthier to a poorer target group 
implies that some individuals who were worse off than the recipients are now better off than 
the new service beneficiaries. Their marginal utility of donating, thus, increases through the 
change of recipients. Given that this increase is sufficiently large, i.e., the sign of Equation 
(3) turns positive, the entrepreneur indeed receives more donations.    
Second, social entrepreneurs should make sure that the benefit of their social service or, 
closely related, the service quality, is not too high. This recommendation emanates from the 
fact that financiers dislike services which make recipients better off than themselves. As long 
as the wealth of a recipient is sufficiently low, a further donation of the financier is 
accompanied by a positive recipient effect. However, once the financier’s and the recipient’s 
wealth levels are equally large, the effect becomes negative as further contributions now 
increase the disadvantageous inequality between both. In this case, the financier may stop 
contributing or, given the decision is on a non-variable funding amount, he may not give at 
all. This implication is especially relevant for entrepreneurs who give needy individuals the 
opportunity to self-improve their life situation. For example, funding high-quality education 
or granting loans to highly profitable business ideas of yet poor people typically lead to a 
significantly higher future wealth of recipients. In this case inequality-averse financiers may 
remain reluctant if they expect that their own future wealth level could be exceeded.  
Beside the entrepreneurial distribution policy considered in Proposition 1, the financier’s 
willingness to donate is also influenced by his wealth rank among the individuals of concern. 
For an intuitive explanation, consider Figure 2, panel A. By shifting the financier’s wealth 
level from the black to the white point, he approaches the wealth level of six individuals 
below the dashed line, which decreases inequality and, hence, increases his utility. However, 
he simultaneously diverges from the two wealthier individuals, which he dislikes. If, all other 
things being equal, the share of poorer individuals is now increased from 6/8 to 7/8 (e.g., 
through a sufficiently large reduction of the wealth level of a better-off individual), the 
financier’s donation willingness increases. The contribution now reduces inequality toward 
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seven individuals (instead of six) and increases inequality toward only one individual (instead 
of two). This finding is specified by Proposition 2. 
Proposition 2. The financier’s willingness to donate increases with his wealth rank among 
the individuals to whom he compares himself. 
For a technical explanation consider Equation (3). Here, the positive advantage effect 
increases with the number of individuals being poorer *+
 whereas the negative 
disadvantage effect decreases with the number of individuals being at least equally wealthy 
*
 than the financier. As a higher wealth rank increases *+ and reduces *, both the 
advantage and the disadvantage effect increase. Consequently, the financier perceives a 
higher willingness to donate.
Proposition 2 contributes to the prominent discussion on the effects of leadership giving. 
Accordingly, it has been observed that capital fund drives often start by announcing a 
significant initial contribution by a single wealthy donor, and it is hypothesized that this 
contribution affects the behavior of many other donors (Andreoni, 2006). Support for this 
hypothesis is provided by, for example, List and Lucking-Reiley (2002) or Shang and Croson 
(2009). They show in laboratory and field experiments that the information about past 
contributions increases the contributions of new donors. Yet, alternative explanations of such 
observations include, among others, the conformity to social norms (Shang and Croson, 
2009), the existence of fixed costs (Andreoni, 1998), and that leadership gifts serve as a 
signal of the social venture’s imperfectly observable quality (Andreoni, 2006; Vesterlund, 
2003). By applying inequality aversion to the context of social venture financing, we add a 
new explanation to this discussion: Proposition 2 shows that, given a sufficiently large 
contribution, the lead donor becomes poorer than another individual whose marginal utility of 
donating increases. Therefore, the higher the leadership gift is and, hence, the more the 
wealth rank of the lead donor decreases, the more people perceive a higher willingness to 
donate.
It is important to emphasize that a leadership gift can only be effective if all relevant 
details of this contribution are accessible for any other potential financier, for instance, the 
identity of previous contributors, their initial wealth, and the size of their donations. Clearly, 
for social entrepreneurs the publication of such details is not necessary if all potential 
financiers can perfectly observe them. In this case, contributions directly increase the 
willingness to donate of such individuals who become wealthier than the lead donors. In 
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contrast, given that at least one of the three characterized contribution details cannot be 
observed, the behavior of others may remain unaffected. Then, the entrepreneur’s fundraising 
success can only be maximized if the missing information is reported to all potential 
financiers.
A second implication of Proposition 2 concerns the entrepreneur’s communication with 
individuals who do not care for his target group. Typically, such individuals remain reluctant, 
as, from their perspective, a contribution to the social venture represents a waste of funds.17
However, the attitude toward donating will change if the entrepreneur is able to design an 
appropriate information strategy, i.e., apply communication methods that shift the circle of 
concern of reluctant financiers from wealthier individuals (e.g., celebrities or rich neighbors) 
to the target group. Under the assumption that people have a constant perception capacity18
and, hence, compare themselves to a constant number of individuals, their willingness to 
donate will change as predicted by Proposition 2. In practice, an appropriate communication 
strategy brings potential financiers and (poorer) target-group individuals together as close as 
possible, e.g., through detailed reporting of personal backgrounds surrounded by pictures and 
movies or, even more extreme, through personal contact (e.g., letters, visits).19 For example, 
Aidchild seems to apply such a matching-strategy in Uganda where their local shops and 
restaurants not only generate direct revenues for the care centers but also intend to create 
emotional awareness for the social problem.  
The joint consideration of Propositions 1 and 2 yields a further implication: Social 
entrepreneurs should focus their fundraising efforts on sufficiently wealthy people as they are 
most likely to give. Intuitively, if we assume that individuals are equally inequality averse, 
i.e., for all people we have identical - and -values, wealthier individuals tend to show a 
higher contribution willingness. For such individuals the negative disadvantage, the positive 
advantage, and the recipient effect are relatively high. Specifically, the wealthier a financier 
is, the higher (lower) is the share of individuals being poorer (wealthier). By making a 
donation, the financier, thus, approaches (departs from) the wealth level of more (less) 
individuals, which implies a higher advantage (disadvantage) effect. Even the recipient effect 
17 In Equation (3) the recipient effect is zero. 
18 This assumption is supported by various psychologists, e.g., Sweller (1988). 
19 The argumentation is supported by Simon (1997) who found that a higher allocation of media coverage to 
foreign earthquakes increases aggregate donations from U.S. citizens. 
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is larger because the entrepreneur’s good or service reaches more individuals that are poorer 
than the financier.  
The final behavioral issue which will be analyzed in this section relates to the desirability 
of the financier’s own consumption. In principle, when planning for social-value creation, the 
entrepreneur has the opportunity to design the good or service from scratch. Thereby, he can 
choose to supply also the financier with costless direct consumption benefits. For example, 
activities like reporting donations or naming tangible assets after the donor (e.g., buildings, 
institutions, or initiatives) create a good image and, thus, a benefit for the financier. 
Additionally, the entrepreneur’s choice of the legal status may allow donors to receive tax 
exempts. Entrepreneurs could also provide direct consumption benefits to financiers if they 
design their good or service as a public good. Consider, for example the healthcare context. 
Medical treatments or micro-health insurances at subsidized prices are social services which 
are typically not offered to the social organization’s funders. However, the change of general 
healthcare conditions, e.g., through a public demonstration of health-conscious consumption 
or through reducing a health-threatening environmental pollution, would be a public good, 
which also reaches the financier. Public-good design alternatives for entrepreneurs can also 
be found in the education sector: Exclusive university courses for needy people are private 
services whereas Massive Open Online Courses (MOOCs) feature elements of a public good 
and are usually accessible for financiers. 
Clearly, the entrepreneur’s decision on the financiers’ own consumption benefits should 
have an effect on their contribution willingness. One could expect, at a first glance, that 
financiers would always prefer a costless own consumption. However, the argumentation 
does not hold for financiers with a sufficiently high aversion toward being better off. In 
principle, financiers donate because they wish to reduce inequality toward poorer individuals. 
If they now receive own consumption benefits, the reduction of the advantageous inequality 
is counteracted. Since this negative effect dominates the benefits associated with the own 
consumption, if the financier perceives a high aversion toward advantageous inequality, he 
will, in a first instance, dislike own direct benefits. We formulate this result as follows:  
Proposition 3. The financier dislikes own consumption benefits, if the aversion toward 
advantageous inequality is sufficiently high. 
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For a technical explanation of the result consider the marginal utility of donating, given 
by Equation (3). We find that an own consumption benefit (  ) implies a lower marginal 
utility if  is sufficiently high, i.e.,      ! *
 *+ .
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Paradoxically, the dislike of costless own consumption benefits does not imply that 
financiers contribute less. To the contrary, the contribution will increase, if it benefits poorer 
individuals at least as much as wealthier people, i.e., the recipient effect is non-negative. Two 
effects explain this reaction: First, by donating to the social organization, the financier wishes 
to reduce inequality toward poorer individuals. However, the own consumption benefit 
increases the wealth of the financier and, simultaneously, the advantageous inequality. The 
financier anticipates this wealth increase and counteracts by donating more. Second, as the 
achievement of a given wealth level now requires higher donations there is also a higher total 
benefit for recipients, which, additionally, increases the financier’s willingness to donate. We 
capture our result in Proposition 4. 
Proposition 4. Given a non-negative recipient effect, the financier contributes more if he 
receives own consumption benefits. 
The financier contributes to the social enterprise until the marginal utility of donating, as 
characterized by Equation (3), turns negative. The sign of the marginal utility in Equation (3), 
thereby, depends on the number of individuals in the financier’s circle of concern who are at 
least as wealthy as the financier (*). If we set Equation (3) equal to zero, employ *+   
  *
,
21 and solve for *, we obtain its optimal size *
/  0  
1 ! 
23   !
04   
2 5 with 4 as the recipient effect as defined by Equation (3). Now consider the 
derivative of *
/ with respect to the financier’s own consumption benefit . Given that the 
recipient effect is non-negative, an increase in  implies a constant or higher *
/. The 
realization of *
/, thus, requires the financier to donate more to the social enterprise in order 
to offset the own consumption benefits. 
20 The argumentation shows that the own consumption is more attractive to a financier if 
 &    ! *
 *+ . However this result does not imply that the financier donates at all. A contribution 
would demand a positive marginal utility of donating, which, in turn, requires a sufficiently high . It can be 
shown, that there is an interval for   that implies both a positive marginal utility of donating and a desirability 
for own consumption if the entrepreneur’s allocation causes a positive recipient effect for the financier. 
21 Note that all individuals in the circle of concern    are either included in *+ or in *.
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The implications of Propositions 3 and 4 for social entrepreneurs are obvious. If the 
entrepreneur solicits for relatively small donations per financier, e.g., in order to diversify 
funding sources, he should give financiers the opportunity to decide on their own 
consumption level. The entrepreneur thereby maximizes total funds, as contributors with 
relatively high aversion toward advantageous inequality will wish not to consume, whereas 
others prefer own consumption. In contrast, if the entrepreneur does not offer this 
consumption choice, a disadvantaged financier may choose to fund a competing organization. 
In practice, self-consumption decisions are indeed implemented for financiers by some social 
ventures. For example, Wikipedia or MOOCs are offered costlessly via the internet and 
financiers can but do not need to use the service. 
However, the situation is different if the entrepreneur wishes to maximize individual 
donations. As Proposition 4 suggests, in this case financiers should receive a direct 
consumption benefit independent of its desirability. For example, the entrepreneur could 
announce to publicly report every donation or to name buildings, institutions, or initiatives 
after the donor, irrespective of whether or not the contributor prefers this. The financier is 
also not able to refuse own consumption benefits, if public goods are provided, such as 
environmental protection, the change of a legal system, or the preservation of security. 
Specifically, the effects of an entrepreneur’s environmental initiative usually reach all 
individuals in a given region, even contributors.
The presented four propositions indicate the large variety of behavioral issues whose 
analyses benefit from a postulation of the F&S-preference function. New insights will also 
emerge if the preference form is applied to further important research questions. One of those 
issues, for example, concerns the effects of the social organization’s legal status on the 
financier’s contribution willingness. Seminal work in this field has been done by Hansmann 
(1980) who emphasizes the importance of the non-distribution constraint in attracting 
donations to a social organization. Accordingly, donors dislike for-profit ventures as a 
fraction of their funds could be extracted by the owners. The application of F&S preferences 
sheds a new light on this discussion: The financier’s willingness to contribute depends 
crucially on the comparison of his own wealth with that of the entrepreneur. If, for example, 
the financier cares for the entrepreneur and is wealthier, his choice of the contribution level 
does not depend on the entrepreneur’s legal status. Both a profit extraction and a transfer of 
the contribution to poorer individuals imply equally high recipient effects and, thus, account 
for the financier’s indifference. 
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As a second promising research direction we suggest a consideration of the relationship 
between an organization’s efficiency and a financier’s willingness to provide funds. In 
industries with several competing entrepreneurs the efficiency level is one of the key 
indicators for social investors. Specifically, the higher the efficiency is, the more attractive a 
social venture is as an investment opportunity. In this respect, the empirical literature on 
charitable giving shows that the willingness to donate increases with the share of donations 
that is used for the social purpose (Posnett and Sandler, 1989; Okten and Weisbrod, 2000). 
The F&S-preference function offers several features that allow for a differentiated analysis of 
the efficiency issue. Specifically, the efficiency of the social organization is, on the one hand, 
embedded in the transformation coefficient  (compare Equation (2)) which represents the 
consumption impact for an individual %. A low efficiency due to high administration costs, for 
example, would result in a relatively low consumption outcome for the recipient. On the other 
hand, as indicated previously, financiers consider organizations that serve the “wrong” 
individuals as inefficient. In this respect, serving too wealthy people or individuals that the 
financier does not care for constitutes a “waste of money”. Such different forms of 
inefficiency should have different effects on the relative attractiveness of social organizations 
which compete against each other for social funding.  
5. Conclusion 
This paper identifies inequality aversion as an analytically tractable and most basic 
motivation of social financiers. We show that the decision structures of such financiers are 
typically equivalent to the well-known experimental settings of the dictator and the public-
good game. In their seminal work F&S discover that inequality aversion best explains 
individual behavior in experiments. By contrasting the behavior of social financiers, we find 
that the F&S-preference specification is also a promising candidate to characterize the 
financier’s motivation. 
We then use inequality aversion to derive general propositions concerning the financier’s 
behavior and identify several important implications for social entrepreneurs. Most 
paradoxically, we show that financiers dislike a direct own consumption benefit (e.g. through 
consuming the entrepreneur’s good or service) if they are sufficiently averse toward being 
better off. Nevertheless, social entrepreneurs should provide funders with such benefits as 
this will maximize individual contributions. Specifically, the financiers will increase giving 
to compensate the disliked own benefits.  
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The identification of inequality aversion as the driving motive of social financiers should 
be especially useful for social entrepreneurs, policy makers, and researchers. As we indicated 
within our analysis, knowing the basic motivation of financiers helps the entrepreneur 
develop a best practice to attract a maximum of funds. In addition, policy makers benefit as 
the knowledge of the financier’s objective enables them to predict their reactions to different 
political settings which could include tax regimes or governmental co-funding. Finally, the 
application of inequality aversion should also help researchers explain further empirical 
evidence on the behavior of social financiers.
Our analysis indicates general directions for future empirical research. Yet, relatively 
little is known about the main determinants of the circle of concern. Why does an individual 
compare himself to some people and not to others? Do individuals typically compare 
consumption levels, budgets to satisfy specific needs, or, more generally, total incomes? A 
further research issue could challenge the explanatory power of inequality aversion in 
experiments that account for the entrepreneurial transformation process. How do giving 
patterns change if recipients do not obtain money from the experimenter but real goods such 
as cafeteria or fuel vouchers? Related to this issue is also the question whether inequality 
aversion explains well the financiers giving behavior to for-profit social entrepreneurs. Put 
differently, how does the behavior of contributors in experiments change if an intermediate 
distributor can keep an unknown share of the money for own consumption?  
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